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Abstract
Claims that the VAT facilitates tax enforcement by generating paper trails on trans-
actions between rms contributed to widespread VAT adoption worldwide, but there
is surprisingly little evidence. This paper analyzes the role of third party informa-
tion for VAT enforcement through two randomized experiments among over 400,000
Chilean rms. Announcing additional monitoring has less impact on transactions that
are subject to a paper trail, indicating the paper trail's preventive deterrence eect.
This leads to strong enforcement spillovers up the VAT chain. These ndings conrm
that when taking evasion into account, signicant dierences emerge between otherwise
equivalent forms of taxation.
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11 Introduction
A fundamental constraint for taxation is that governments need to be able to observe
transactions in the economy in order to be able to impose a tax on them. A growing literature
therefore argues that understanding information ows is central to eective taxation. When
governments imperfectly observe transactions, important dierences emerge between forms
of taxation that are equivalent in standard models of taxation but dier in the information
they generate for the government (Slemrod, 2008).1 Third-party reporting, veriable paper
trails, and whistle-blowers are thought to play an important role in facilitating tax enforce-
ment (Kopczuk and Slemrod, 2006; Kleven et al., 2009, 2011; Kumler et al., 2012). The
challenge of enforcing taxation is particularly severe in developing countries, where many
transactions in the economy are not readily observable by the government, and it has been
argued that these limited sources of information can explain some of the key dierences in
tax systems between developed and developing countries (Gordon and Li, 2009; Besley and
Persson, 2012).2
The Value Added Tax (VAT) is a stark example of a tax believed to facilitate enforce-
ment through a built-in incentive structure that generates a third-party reported paper trail
on transactions between rms, which makes it harder to hide the transaction from the gov-
ernment (e.g. Tait, 1972; Burgess and Stern, 1993; Agha and Haughton, 1996; Kopczuk and
Slemrod, 2006). This belief has contributed to one of the most signicant developments in
tax policy of recent decades (Keen and Lockwood, 2010): a striking increase in VAT adoption
from 47 countries in 1990 to over 140 today (Bird and Gendron, 2007). There is, however,
surprisingly little evidence evaluating these self-enforcing properties of the VAT.
This paper investigates the role of third-party reported paper trails for tax enforcement,
and tests for the self-enforcing properties in the VAT through two randomized eld experi-
ments with over 445,000 rms in Chile. A rst experiment, the large-scale \Letter Message
Experiment," evaluates the eects of the VAT paper trail across the entire economy in a
fully developed VAT system. It investigates whether the presence of the VAT paper trail
lowers the tax payment response to an increase in the perceived audit probability of ran-
domly chosen rms. This would suggest that the paper trail has a preventive deterrence
1Information constraints have been a key feature of models in the optimal taxation literature as well.
While ability is not observable in these models, most transactions in the economy are typically assumed to
be observable.
2Tax evasion is a fundamental challenge for developing countries, where on average, the informal sector
represents about 40% of GDP, ranging up to 70% (Schneider et al., 2010). High evasion rates can not only
severely restrict funding for basic public infrastructure, they can also lead to signicant distortions in the
economy. Even in the US, overall tax evasion is estimated to be around 16% (Internal Revenue Service,
2008), a loss similar in size to the entire corporate income tax.
2eect on evasion. Since a paper trail facilitates detection of evasion during the audit, one
would expect rms to respond more to an increase in the audit probability where a paper
trail is present, if evasion levels are equal across transactions. Observing that a given rm
responds less on its transactions that are covered by a paper trail therefore suggests that
the preventive deterrence eect of the paper trail was strong enough to reduce evasion to
the point where an increase in the audit probability has a smaller eect. The experiment
exploits the fact that the incentive structure built into the VAT system, which generates the
paper trail, breaks down at the nal production stage, where sales are made to consumers,
rather than other rms: while it is in rms' interest to ask suppliers for receipts in order to
deduct input costs from their VAT bill, consumers have no incentive to do so.
The Chilean Tax Authority sent letters indicating an increased audit probability to over
100 thousand randomly selected rms. While the letters generate an immediate and strong
increase in VAT payments, this eect is much weaker on transactions between rms, where
the paper trail is present, than on sales to nal consumers, where there is no VAT paper trail.
This holds true not only when comparing between rms with dierent shares of nal sales,
but also when comparing the response of dierent types of transactions within a given rm.
Consistent with a model by Kleven et al. (2009) about the impact of rm size on evasion,
I also nd that small rms respond more to the deterrence message. There is suggestive
evidence that a substantial fraction of the higher response in smaller rms may be driven by
their higher propensity to sell at the retail level, where the VAT paper trail is absent.3
Conceptually, this type of intervention represents an indirect use of randomized experi-
ments, as dened by Khwaja and Mian (2011). It allows studying an existing policy at large
scale, even if the policy itself cannot be randomized. The idea is to test whether randomly
induced variation of another factor that interacts with the policy (in our case the perceived
audit probability) generates the response that would be predicted based on the underlying
mechanism if the policy is eective. The two experiments provide both types of interventions
in the classication of Ludwig et al. (2011). The Letter Message Experiment is an (indirect)
policy evaluation, aimed at testing whether the policy works on a nation-wide level, while
the second experiment, the \Spillover Experiment," is a mechanism experiment, aimed at
showing the underlying mechanism that leads the policy to be eective.
The Spillover Experiment was designed to nd direct evidence for the self-enforcing mech-
3In order to test whether the impact of the letter really stems from deterrence, I also compare its eect
to both a motivational letter that appeals to tax morale and social norms, and a placebo letter that contains
information that is irrelevant for tax compliance. The methodology of analyzing the impact of dierent letter
messages on tax payments was rst developed by Slemrod et al. (2001), and has recently been employed
by Engstrom and Hesselius (2007) and Fellner et al. (Forthcoming), shedding light on the impact of deterrence
and motivational appeals on tax payments by individuals in developed countries.
3anism that underlies the ndings of the Letter Message Experiment. It examines the trans-
mission of tax enforcement through the VAT paper trail up the production chain. The idea
is to jumpstart the eect in a sample where it is not currently well enforced, by injecting
deterrence into the system and observing how it promulgates along the paper trail and up the
production chain. Half of a selected sample of rms suspected of tax evasion was randomly
selected to receive an announcement of an upcoming audit. The whole sample was later
summoned for an audit, and for the 1,527 rms that the tax authority was able to audit,
information about their pre-treatment trading partners was collected.4 The randomly ad-
ministered audit announcement leads to strong spillover eects that increase VAT payments
by the suppliers of the treated rms. In line with the asymmetric incentives between clients
and suppliers in the self-enforcing mechanism of the VAT, tax payments of client rms do
not increase.
Taken together, the two experiments show that for a given rm, the VAT paper trail
acts as a substitute to the rm's own audit probability, and globally the paper trail acts
as a complement to the audit probability, since its eectiveness gets multiplied through
the spillover eects. This represents the rst micro-empirical evidence for the self-enforcing
properties of the VAT. Previous evidence has been limited to cross-country comparisons,
investigating whether countries that adopt a VAT subsequently raise more taxes (e.g. Nellor,
1987; Ebrill, 2001).
These ndings provide the rst evidence of how tax enforcement generates spillovers
through rms' trading networks, and together with Rincke and Traxler (2011), they represent
one of the rst documentations of spillovers in tax enforcement overall. The results imply
that when choosing an optimal audit strategy, a tax authority may not only want to consider
the expected deterrence eect on the audited rm, but also the multiplier eect through the
rm's trading network.
This paper also provides evidence for a larger, mostly theoretical literature on the impor-
tance of information and third-party reporting for eective taxation, particularly in devel-
oping countries (e.g. Kopczuk and Slemrod, 2006; Gordon and Li, 2009; Kleven et al., 2009).
Because evasion is by its nature dicult to detect, and micro-level tax data is highly con-
dential, there has been a dearth of micro-empirical evidence (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002).
One notable exception in this area is an intervention conducted concurrently to this eld
experiment by Kleven et al. (2011), who analyze the individual income tax in Denmark and
formalize the distinction between third-party and self-reported income. They nd that eva-
sion is generally low, except for the small fraction of income for which the government does
not already possess third party-reported information. These results conrm related ndings
4For a discussion of attrition at the auditing stage, see the implementation section below.
4for the income tax on a more aggregate level by the US Taxpayer Compliance Measurement
Program (TCMP) (Internal Revenue Service, 1996, 2006).5
The paper extends the ndings of this literature in several ways. First, it looks at tax
compliance by rms, rather than by individuals. Raising and enforcing tax payments from
rms strongly reduces the number of agents the tax authorities must oversee (Kopczuk
and Slemrod, 2006), and thus may be a more feasible approach for developing countries
to increase tax revenue. Firms can play an important role of aggregators of information
that facilitates tax enforcement. Second, it analyzes tax compliance in a developing country
context. Evasion rates are much higher in poorer countries, and while there is a growing
empirical literature investigating taxation in such contexts (e.g. Engel et al., 1998; Fisman
and Wei, 2004; Olken and Singhal, 2011; Carrillo et al., 2012; Kleven and Waseem, 2012;
Kumler et al., 2012), there is still very little micro-empirical evidence.
Third, the ndings speak to the interplay of information with deterrence in tax enforce-
ment. In the sample of the Spillover Experiment, prior to the audit announcement, self-
enforcement was incomplete at best. The deterrence eect from the audit announcement
was necessary to trigger the eectiveness of the paper trail, showing that it is the interaction
of information with deterrence that leads to eective tax enforcement. Finally, and partic-
ularly relevant for developing countries, the paper nds that third-party records strongly
aect tax compliance even in a context where they are not automatically accessible to the
tax authority. For most transactions in Chile, as in most developing countries, records are
kept in handwritten books. The tax authority can verify them during audits, but in contrast
to many developed countries, these records are not available in electronic form for automatic
cross-checks.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides background on
the VAT in Chile and on the mechanism of the self-enforcement hypothesis of the VAT,
Section 3 describes study design, data and estimation strategy, and Section 4 shows the
results of the Letter Message Experiment and the Spillover Experiment in turn. Section 5
concludes.
5 Alm et al. (2007) study a related question in a lab setting, by experimentally varying the portion of an
individual's income that is subject to third-party reporting, and nd that cheating increases as individuals
earn larger shares of income that are not perfectly detectable.
52 Context
2.1 Background on the VAT and its Use in Chile
As its name suggests, the Value Added Tax is paid on the value added at each production
stage: rms pay VAT on the dierence between total sales and total input costs. The overall
tax base - total value added in the production chain { is therefore equivalent to that of a
sales tax, which is paid on the entire nal value at the retail stage.6 The main dierence
between a VAT and a retail sales tax lies in the way it is collected and in who remits the
tax to the government, a dierence that is irrelevant in most standard tax models, but is
thought to have signicant implications when taking tax administration and tax evasion into
account (Slemrod, 2008).
To comply with VAT obligations, rms have to maintain books of sales and purchases
with corresponding original receipts of transactions, in order to document their declared
amounts of their \tax debit" (sales and other sources of revenue) and \tax credit" (input
costs).7 The book of purchases therefore contains documentation about the sales of rms'
suppliers. This leads to the third-party paper trail along the production chain (henceforth
referred to as \paper trail"). The client rm maintains a record about the sales of the
supplier, which allows for the possibility that the tax authority can cross-check the two
rms' records against each other. In Chile, as in many other countries, most rms do not
have to submit this information to the tax authority. Only very large rms and a small
number of rms who choose to use an online ling system do so. For all other rms, this
information can potentially be accessed by the tax authority through an audit, but not as a
matter of routine. Understanding whether the paper trail can have a preventive deterrence
eect even in these settings is of particular interest. This is also the reason that the tax
authority does not generally know which rms deal with which other rms. For this reason,
the spillover experiment was designed to collect information about rms' trading partners
up and down the production chain.
A large majority of countries around the world currently have a VAT, and for many
developing countries it represents the largest source of tax revenue. In Chile, the VAT
accounts for about half of tax revenues (Servicio de Impuestos Internos, 2010a). Chile has a
single 19% VAT rate on sale of goods and services across all types of products, which is paid
6This equivalence holds when the VAT has a uniform rate and no exemptions.
7This collection method is commonly known as the \credit-invoice method". The vast majority of coun-
tries with a VAT currently use the credit-invoice method with a few exceptions such as Japan that uses the
subtraction method (Grinberg, 2010).
6monthly.8 Only very few industries are exempt, and there is no lower threshold, rms of all
sizes are subject to the VAT.9 This context allows for analysis of the VAT across a large set
of dierent types of rms, without the interference of confounding institutional factors such
as industry-specic exemptions or varying taxation rates. Ocial estimates of VAT evasion
in Chile, based on the comparison of collected VAT to aggregate consumption data from the
central bank, have ranged between 27% and 12% since 1990, with signicant uctuations
from one year to the next (Servicio de Impuestos Internos, 2010b).10
2.2 Mechanism of the \Self-Enforcing" Properties of the VAT
The \self-enforcement"-hypothesis in the VAT is based on the idea that rms have an
incentive to ask their suppliers for receipts because they can deduct input costs from their
VAT bill (Agha and Haughton, 1996). This incentive builds the creation of paper trails
directly into the tax structure. Since the amounts are recorded in two sets of books, the
risk of cross-checks is thought to deter rms from reporting diering amounts (Bird and
Gendron, 2007). In this way, the buyer acts as the third-party, recording a transaction,
which creates a liability for the supplier. An important feature of this mechanism is that the
two sides of a transaction in inter-business trade have opposing incentives: the buyer benets
from overstating the input cost, while the seller benets from understating the sale. In the
middle of the VAT chain, there is therefore no scope for gains from collusion between the two
parties. This mechanism breaks down at the nal production stage, with sales to the nal
consumer, who has no incentive to ask for a receipt. There is therefore no \self-enforcing"
eect for nal transactions.11
There are several reasons why this self-enforcing mechanism might not work in practice.
First, as mentioned above, most rms do not have to report this third-party information
8If the tax credit is greater than the debit for a given month, the excess can be carried over to the
following month and used as a VAT credit (Servicio de Impuestos Internos, 2011).
9Only the following entities are VAT exempt: news organizations, transportation, education, public
universities and hospitals, the central bank, the social security administration, the ministry of national
defense, the national postal services, and the public lottery. As is usual for a VAT, exports are excluded,
and exporters are reimbursed for the VAT cost embedded in the purchase price of their inputs.
10To prevent fraudulent production of fake input receipts from non-existing rms or duplications, all
receipts used for VAT purposes have to be pre-approved and stamped in the oces of the Chilean tax
authority. The tax authority uses the part of the cross-checkable information that is electronically on le
to calculate whether tax declarations display any discrepancies. For the largest discrepancies, letters are
sent informing rms of the discrepancy, and requiring them to explain or correct the situation. Tax ocials
regularly visit retail stores to check that the books are kept in order and correct receipts are used, however,
typically no cross-checks or audits ensue from these visits, unless there is suspicion of grave infraction.
11For this reason, several countries have tried to increase the incentive for the nal consumer, by introducing
such measures as imposing nes for consumers who do not ask for a receipt, organizing lotteries with consumer
receipt, allowing consumers to deduct a fraction of their VAT payments from their income tax, etc.
7directly to the government. The self-enforcing mechanism therefore depends on the deter-
rence eect of a cross-check conducted during a possible audit. The word \self-enforcement"
is therefore misleading, since it can be expected to work only in interaction with credible
deterrence on part of the tax authority. Second, since the mechanism breaks down at the
nal stage, it can potentially unravel from the bottom, if collusion builds up all the way
from the nal stage.
If the mechanism works, we would expect to see a preventive deterrence eect on trans-
actions covered by the paper trail. This will aect how rms respond to an increase in the
audit probability in the following way. The information contained in the paper trail facili-
tates detection of evasion during an audit. At a given level of evasion, one would therefore
expect rms to respond more to an increased audit risk on transactions where a paper trail is
present. The anticipation of this ease of detection can create a preventive deterrence eect,
which reduces evasions ex-ante on transactions with a paper trail. If this deterrence eect is
strong enough, it may reduce evasion to the point where an increase in the audit probability
has a smaller eect on transactions covered by a paper trail (as there is less evasion on these
transactions to begin with). At that point, the paper trail and the audit probability will
interact in a substitutive way. Observing rms responding less on transactions with a paper
trail therefore suggests that ex-ante evasion was lower on these transactions. The Letter
Message Experiment tests whether this is the case.12
We can distinguish two forms of VAT evasion on inter-rm transactions. Through \Omis-
sion" a transaction is completely omitted from the books of both the seller and the buyer
rm. This requires collusion, and as discussed above only reduces overall VAT payments if it
is carried through all the way to the end of the production chain. \Discrepancies", represents
evasion where a paper trail is created, but with discrepancies in the amounts that the buyer
and seller report for the transaction.13 This type of evasion is based on the hope that the
tax authority will not cross-check the records.
The Spillover Experiment complements the ndings of the Letter Message Experiment by
showing the mechanism by which the preventive deterrence eect on inter-rm transactions
discussed above comes about. It analyzes the spillover eects of randomly generated audit
pre-announcements on rms' trading partners. These spillover eects can operate through a
reduction of both types of evasion on inter-rm evasion described above.
[Table 1]
12As discussed in more detail in the results section, the necessary assumption is that a lower response is
not driven by other dierences within rms for the type of transactions covered by a paper trail.
13In order to reduce tax liability, the seller will tend to understate the value of a transaction, while the
buyer will tend to inate it.
8In the case of omission, an increase in the audit probability of a trading partner increases
the likelihood that this partner will insist that the transaction be \on the books." Hence,
the audit pre-announcement can generate a paper trail. As illustrated in Table 1, this has
asymmetric eects depending on whether a rm is a supplier or a client of the treated rm
(i.e. of the rm that receives the pre-announcement). If the treated rm starts demanding
a receipt, this will lead to an increase in suppliers' declared sales and therefore in suppliers'
tax liability. For client rms, on the contrary, it will lead to an increase in declarable input
costs, thereby lowering their tax liability. In the case of discrepancies, the spillover eects
are symmetric for both suppliers and clients. The increased risk of cross-checks will lead
all rms to revise their declared transactions in the direction of the actual value, increasing
their tax liabilities.
Taking both types of evasion together, the eect of an increase in the audit probability
on reported tax liability is unambiguously positive in the case of the suppliers, while in the
case of clients, it is ambiguous depending on which type of inter-rm evasion dominates. The
Spillover Experiment tests whether increasing a rm's audit probability indeed increases VAT
payments by its trading partners, and whether this eect is asymmetrically concentrated on
its suppliers.
3 Study Design, Data and Empirical Specication
3.1 Study Design: Letter Message Experiment
Both randomized eld studies analyzed in this paper were conducted in collaboration with
the Chilean Tax Authority (\Servicio de Impuestos Internos"). Research design diagrams
for both experiments can be found in Figure A8 of the Appendix. The goal of the \Letter
Message Experiment" is to evaluate the eectiveness of the VAT paper trail across the entire
economy in a fully developed, well-functioning VAT system. Through letters sent by the tax
authority, we vary the perceived audit probability of randomly chosen rms. The goal is to
test for dierential responses by whether or not transactions are covered by the VAT paper
trail, i.e. whether the transactions are between other rms or to the nal consumers. As
discussed in Section 2, if we nd that transactions that are subject to a paper trail respond
less to an increase in the perceived audit probability, this indicates that the paper trail had
a preventive deterrence eect prior to the intervention.
The main intervention consists of a letter containing a message of deterrence sent to
102,000 randomly selected rms in a stratied sample among most rms in the country. The
letter is aimed at increasing the perceived audit probability by informing the rm that it has
9been randomly chosen for an analysis and that if any irregularities are detected, it may be
audited (see Appendix A for the full text of all letters). This intervention did not aect the
actual audit probability. Formally, the content of the message was nevertheless factually true
{ as certied after careful consideration by the tax authority's legal department { since the
tax authority routinely analyses all rms, and rms may always be audited if irregularities
are detected.14 The impact of the letter is measured by comparing the VAT payments of
recipient rms to payments by the 306,600 rms randomly selected not to receive any letter.
The goal of the Letter Message Experiment is, however, not to measure the overall eect
of the letter on rm compliance. The intention is to shed light on the eectiveness of the
paper trail by analyzing how it interacts with the expected audit probability. This is achieved
by comparing the responsiveness of line-items in the VAT declaration that are covered by
the paper trail, i.e. transactions between two rms { to line items that are not { i.e. sales to
nal consumers. We can do this both across rms with dierent shares of their sales going
to nal consumers, and within rms by comparing the responsiveness of dierent line-items
to each other. The latter allows holding constant any dierence that may exist across rms
with dierent shares of nal sales, such as rm size, risk aversion, ease of hiding evasion etc.
Finally, the Letter Message Experiment also allows comparing the eect across dierent
types of rms.15 In particular, I can test predictions about rm size. Kleven et al. (2009),
for example, posit that large rms evade fewer taxes, since rms with more employees run a
higher risk that a whistle-blower among their employees informs the government about unre-
ported transactions. The employees in this case function as potential third-party reporters.
We might therefore expect that rm size, similarly to the VAT paper trail, has a preventive
deterrence eect that leads to a lower response to an increase in the audit probability. At the
same time, smaller rms also tend to have a larger share of sales going to nal consumers.
Controlling for both rm size and share of nal sales, we can get a sense of how much of the
dierential response by size may be driven by the degree of retail sales.16
14It is important to note that even though used surprisingly frequently in practice, sending out deterrence
letters which are not backed up by a corresponding increase in the actual audit probability is not a policy
that seems sustainable in the long-run. As a tool of analysis, it can be used to study dierential responses by
line item or type of tax payer, both for academic research or to optimize audit strategies (see Marshall and
Pomeranz, 2011). However, ideally, tax authorities or other enforcement agencies using it should combine it
with real changes in audit policy, particularly if repeated regularly, since it could otherwise start undermining
the agency's credibility. Nevertheless, the strong response to the second wave of this experiment suggests
that the deterrence letters do not lose their power very quickly.
15The Letter Message Experiment was also used to analyze other rm characteristics not reported in this
paper, which are of interest to the tax authority, such as rm age, region, industry, etc. Based on the analysis
of what type of rms are more likely to respond, we developed an instrument to optimize audit strategies
for the Chilean Tax Authority (see Marshall and Pomeranz, 2011).
16However, it is important to keep in mind that such cross-rm comparisons have to be interpreted with
caution, since in contrast to the within-rm estimates used to study the paper trail, other unobserved rm
10In order to test whether the impact of the letter really stems from deterrence, two addi-
tional letters, sent to a sample of about 18,500 each, were included in the study: a tax morale
letter aimed at aecting perceived social norms and a \placebo" letter to test whether the
simple fact of receiving mail from the tax authority was driving the impact. The placebo
letter simply informs rms about some new features on the tax authority's website. The
tax morale letter contains a message aimed at increasing the perceived social norm of tax
compliance.17
3.2 Study Design: Spillover Experiment
While the Letter Message Experiment studies whether overall for representative rms,
the paper trail interacts in a substitutive way with the audit probability, the Spillover Ex-
periment is designed to show the underlying self-enforcing mechanisms in action. It analyzes
whether, as predicted by the self-enforcement hypothesis, increased tax enforcement on one
rm generates spillovers to its trading partners up the VAT chain. In order to analyze
how the self-enforcing mechanism gets triggered by injecting deterrence into the system, the
Spillover Experiment focuses on a set of rms where compliance is ex-ante expected to be
low.
The intervention of the Spillover Experiment is as follows. 5,600 rms were scheduled
for an audit by the tax authority. Half of them were randomly selected to receive a pre-
announcement for this audit (see Appendix Figure A4). The other half did not receive any
message from the tax authority. Half a year later, the tax authority started summoning
all rms in the sample to appear at the tax oce for an audit. Since the tax authority
does not have information on which rms trade with which, information about trading
partners was collected during the audits. For the rms the tax authority was able to audit,18
auditors recorded information about the trading partners from the transaction records in
the rms' books of sales and purchases for the three months prior to the mailing of the
pre-announcement. This made it possible to identify the rms' main suppliers and clients in
a period not yet aected by the treatment.
Based on this information, the spillover eects of the audit pre-announcement on suppliers
and clients of the treated rms can be measured by comparing their declared VAT to the
declared VAT of suppliers and clients of the control rms, before and after the time when the
characteristics may aect the dierential estimates.
17Motivational messages have been found to increase voluntary cooperation in some instances. For exam-
ple, Dal B o and Dal B o (2009) nd that moral suasion can increase cooperation in the lab, especially when
coupled with deterrence, and Fellner et al. (Forthcoming) nd that social norm letters increase compliance
with broadcast tax obligations for those who live in regions with generally low compliance.
18For a discussion of attrition at the auditing stage see Section 3.3 below.
11audit pre-announcement was sent out. Finding that trading partners of treated rms increase
their declared VAT compared to trading partners of control rms indicates a spillover eect,
since whether or not ones' trading partner was treated is randomly assigned.
3.3 Implementation and Data
The universe of rms considered in this study consists of almost all rms in Chile that
were operating in June 2008 and had declared a positive amount of VAT for at least one
month between July 2007 and June 2008. A subsample of 5,600 rms was selected for the
Spillover Experiment, the remainder is in the Deterrence Letter Experiment. The only rms
that were excluded from the study were very large rms and rms in the Letter Message
Experiment that had undeliverable addresses and could therefore not receive a letter. The
main data used in the study consists of information from the monthly VAT declarations by
rms, starting in January 2008. In addition, I merge this data with some rm characteristics
such as rm size, number of employees, industry, etc.
Implementation and Summary Statistics: Letter Message Experiment
Most letters in the Letter Message Experiment were sent in early December 2008, aecting
tax declarations starting in November 2008, which are due in the following month. A smaller,
also randomly chosen second wave of letters was mailed ve months later, in order to study
whether the eectiveness of the letters decreased over time.
In order to increase compliance with treatment assignment in the study sample, we
were able to undertake a special procedure with the Chilean Postal Service to exclude rms
with invalid postal addresses from both the treatment and the control group of the Letter
Message Experiment, leaving a sample of 445,734 rms. This allowed me to reduce the share
of treatment rms that did not receive the letter from around 26% to 6%, thus substantially
increasing statistical power. Table 2 presents summary statistics for the treatment groups in
the Letter Message Experiment, compared to the control group. None of the dierences in
average characteristics between the treatment groups and the control group are statistically
signicant at the 10%-level.
[Table 2]
Firms in the Letter Message Experiment pay an average of 264,000 pesos (equivalent to
about 500 USD) in monthly VAT, with a median of approximately 70,000 (equivalent to
about 140 USD). The large dierence between the mean and the median indicates a very
12large dispersion in the distribution of tax payments. As discussed below, this dispersion has
implications for the empirical specication of the analysis.
Firms in Chile are categorized into ve groups by size, based on their sales revenues during
the preceding tax year: micro, small, medium, large-sized rms, and rms with no sales in
the preceding tax year.19 Micro-sized rms are by far the largest group, comprising 74.5%
of the rms. The second largest group are small rms (18.2%), followed by medium (2.8%),
and rms with no sales in the preceding year (1.5%). The remaining three percent are new
rms that have not been yet classied. Firms are also balanced across the treatment groups
with respect to their position in the production chain: 28.8% are retailers that sell only to
nal consumers and 38.2% are intermediary rms that sell only to other rms. Overall, the
share of sales that go to nal consumers is 45.6%.
Implementation and Summary Statistics: Spillover Experiment
The letters containing the audit pre-announcement for the Spillover Experiment were also
sent in early December 2008, aecting tax payments starting in November 2008. The sample
selected for this analysis consists of mostly rural, micro size rms, with tax declarations that
show patterns suggestive of evasion. These rms had submitted VAT declarations regularly
each month and had not been found guilty of any infractions, but they continually reported
sales smaller than their input costs, without going out of business.20 Since many of these
small rms were located in remote areas, there was a substantial fraction with no valid postal
address. In these cases, the tax authority agreed to deliver the audit pre-announcement in
person to the rms' location. They were able to reach 96% of assigned rms, but there were
several weeks of delay for part of them.
Table 3, Columns (1) and (2) present summary statistics for the 5,600 rms in the original
sample of the Spillover Experiment. None of the dierences between treatment and control
group are statistically signicant at the 10% level. Since this sample was selected for having
suspiciously high input costs compared to their sales, it is not surprising that their reported
sales/input-ratio is suspiciously low, averaging only 0.67, and their actual mean declared
VAT is negative. The mean of -18,452 pesos indicates that on average, these rms declare
about 37 US dollars more in tax deduction from input costs than liabilities from sales, and
the median VAT declaration is zero. The sample consists of very small, rural rms, mostly in
remote areas: all are micro size, and they are among the smallest even within that category,
19Micro size rms sell less than the equivalent of 100,000 USD per year, small rms have sales between
100,000 and 1.1 million USD, medium size rms between 1.1 and 4.2 million USD, and large rms over 4.2
million USD.
20Even though sales can temporarily be lower than input costs, for example when rms make large invest-
ments into costly inputs, over the long-run, this pattern raises suspicion.
13with an average of 2.3 on the ocial rm size sub-classication within micro size, which
ranges from 2 to 4.21 Compared to other rms in the country, they also have a smaller share
of nal sales (16%), and are more likely to be in the agricultural sector (54%).
[Table 3]
The fact that information about the trading partners was obtained during the audits
lead to substantial attrition in the nal sample for the Spillover Experiment. Due to ad-
ministrative delays in the delivery of the audit notices, followed by the consequences of a
very large earthquake, only about 27% of the 5,600 rms were actually audited, and they
provided information about 2,829 trading partners. One potential concern of this attrition
rate is that it might introduce selection bias if it creates dierences between the treatment
and control group within the remaining sample. Since the attrition was mainly driven by
the degree to which an area was aected by the earthquake, it is plausibly exogenous to the
randomly assigned treatment. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 suggest that this is indeed
the case. Treatment and control rms do not dier in their probability of being audited and
there is no signicant dierence in the characteristics of treatment and control rms among
the audited sample, apart from a somewhat higher proportion of rms in the agricultural
sector.
A separate potential issue is that rms that received a pre-announcement might have
selectively removed or changed the trading partners in their books compared to those that
did not receive a pre-announcement. There are several reason why this does not seem to be
a concern in practice. First, as shown in Columns (5) and (6), trading partners of treated
rms do not dier from those of control rms, except for a slightly lower share of months in
which they failed to submit a declaration. Second, due to the audit method of the Chilean
Tax Authority, such dierential manipulations between treated and control rms are not
very likely, since all audited rms, including those in the control group, receive an audit
notice in written form weeks before they come in to the tax oce to get audited. Finally,
even if rms would have selectively removed their most delinquent trading partners from
their books, this would actually lead to a downward biased estimate of the spillover eects.
As the rest of the balance table shows, overall, the trading partners in the Spillover
Experiment are substantially larger than the audited rms, both in terms of their VAT paid
and their ocial size category. The have about the same average age and a slightly higher
share of their sales going to nal consumers, and are much less likely to be in the agricultural
sector. Their sales/input-ratio is in a much less suspicious range, with an average of 1.6.
About 57% of trading partners are suppliers of the audited rms, while the rest are clients.
21Given that the ocial size classication is based on declared sales, and that this sample is suspected of
under-declaring their true sales, this is likely to be an underestimate of the true size of these rms' operations.
143.4 Empirical Strategy
The main outcome variable used is declared VAT, i.e. 19% of declared sales minus
declared input costs.22 As discussed above, the dispersion of monthly declared VAT is very
large. It ranges from -800 billion pesos (equivalent to -1.7 billion USD) to 16 billion pesos (33
million USD). For illustration, Figure A5 in the Appendix shows this very large dispersion,
even excluding the top and bottom 5% of values. At the same time, there is a large density
at zero. Such a large variance and the fat tails of the distribution imply that analyzing the
impact of the intervention on the mean of declared VAT does not lead to any signicant
results, because the resulting variance is extremely large. I therefore use quantile regressions
as well as linear probability models for the likelihood that declared VAT is larger than three
key thresholds: (1) zero for the extensive margin, (2) VAT declared in the same month of
the previous year, and (3) the predicted value based on the control group.
The latter two specications have the advantage of not being sensitive to scale. This
is important, given that much of the analysis does not focus on the overall impact of the
treatment, but rather on the comparison of the response for dierent types of transactions or
rms. Since the amount in pesos will mechanically be larger in larger types of transactions or
rms, and the probability of declaring zero VAT will be smaller, both the quantile regressions
and the extensive margin are not appropriate to analyze dierential responses. For such
comparisons, measures that captured relative changes are indicated.
Quantile regressions provide an indication of the magnitude of the impact, while being
much less sensitive to extreme values than the mean. The specication used throughout is a
dierence-in-dierence approach, comparing treated rms to control rms and pre-treatment
to post-treatment period. The specication for the quantile regressions is therefore
Q(V ATitjZi;t) =  + (Zi  post) + Zi + @t; (1)
where Zi is the treatment assignment dummy indicating that a rm is in the treatment
group, @t stands for month xed eects and Zi  post indicates treatment, i.e. a rm in the
treatment group in the post-treatment period.
The linear probability models are analyzed using the following specications:
Tit =  + (Zi  post) + Zi + @t + eit; (2)
22This value can be negative, as input costs can exceed sales in a given month. In this case the rm can
carry the negative amount over to the next month as a tax credit. All measures used in this paper exclude
the carry-over from the previous month, so that the analysis focuses on the new transactions in the current
month.
15where Tit is the binary tax outcome for individual i in month t. The probability of de-
tecting any positive amount, Tit = LargerZeroit, captures the extensive margin. However,
similar to the quantile regression, this measure will vary with the size of transactions or
rms. For analysis of dierential responses, a measure capturing relative change is required.
One specication that satises this concern is the linear probability model with the outcome
dummy indicating whether declared VAT is higher in the current month compared to the
same month a year earlier: Tit = V ATIncreaseit. This outcome has several benets com-
pared to alternative measures. First, as opposed to log specications or count data models, it
is applicable to variables that include zero or negative values, such as is the case for declared
VAT. In addition, it provides a relative measure indicating a change in tax declarations
compared to the rm's own history, it is robust against outliers, and at the same time takes
into account rms in all parts of the VAT distribution.23
One possible remaining confounding factor could be dierential time trends between
dierent types of transactions, which could lead to dierences in the probability of an increase
compared to the previous year. As a robustness check, I therefore also run a specication
with an outcome dummy that indicates whether declared VAT is higher than the predicted
value for that rm in that month: Tit = LargerPredictedit. The prediction is based on
median regressions among the rms in the control group and uses as predictors the rms'
pre-treatment VAT payments, as well as those characteristics, for which dierential treatment
eects are evaluated in this paper, such as size and the share of sales to nal consumers.24
When comparing the impact of the letter messages for dierent line-items, I use an
additional within-rm estimation to hold any dierential rm characteristics constant. For
example, when comparing sales to input costs, there are two observations for each rm and
month: one for its sales and one for its input costs. An interaction term between the type of
transaction and treatment captures the dierential impact on dierent line-items. Including
the necessary controls, this gives the following regression:
LineItemIncreaseitl = +(ci post)+ci +@t +(Zi postl)+(postl)+l +eitl; (3)
where l indicates the line-item, ci captures the rm xed eects controlling for any between-
23One of the alternative specications is quantile regressions using a normalized version of monthly tax
payments in the form of monthly VAT/(pre-treatment average VAT). However, this specication is very
sensitive to rms with very small pre-treatment averages, which end up with very high values when dividing
by their pre-treatment value. Also, since the median of some line-items is zero, median regressions for these
line-items are not informative, and the choice of alternative quantiles becomes to a certain extent arbitrary.
24Predicted medians are used instead of means, since due to the high variance, the predicted mean is
again not very informative, and few rms end up close to their predicted mean. The predicting regression is
therefore: Q(V ATijpreV ATi;Xi) =  + preV ATi + X
0
i, where preVAT is the rm's average monthly
VAT prior to November 2008.
16rm variation, and ci post captures rm xed-eects times treatment period, to control for
any dierential trends within the rms.  therefore represents the coecient of interest: the
dierential response of line item l for the treatment group in the treatment period.
All regression analysis of the Letter Message Experiment includes both waves of mailing.
To this eect, treatment rms are included until four months after treatment (the time during
which the overall eect of the deterrence letter is the strongest), which is until February 2009
for the rst wave and June 2009 for the second, and control rms are included until June
2009.25 Since in the implementation of the Spillover Experiments some pre-announcement
letters were delivered with delays, a six months post-treatment window is used in the Spillover
Experiment. This corresponds to an average of four months after delivering of the letter, to
be equivalent to the post-treatment window of the Letter Message Experiment.26
Given that the random variation aects only the rms' perceived audit probabilities,
holding everything else constant, following Engel et al. (2001), I interpret changes in declared
income in response to the randomized interventions as changes in tax evasion. There may,
however, also be a response of real economic activity. The increased tax payments following
the increased perceived audit risk reduce business protability and may lead to increased
prices, which, in turn, may decrease demand. All this may lead rms to reduce production.
The observed increase in declared VAT may therefore be an underestimate of the reduction
in evasion resulting from the treatment, since a reduction in production would lead to a
decrease in declared VAT.
4 Results
4.1 Letter Message Experiment
The Letter Message Experiment examines how the VAT-generated paper trail interacts
with tax enforcement for representative rms across Chile, by testing whether the increase in
the expected audit probability induced by the deterrence letter has a lower eect on reporting
of transactions that are subject to the VAT paper trail { i.e. transactions between two rms
{ compared to transactions that are not { i.e. sales to the nal consumer. The following
section rst establishes the overall eectiveness of the deterrence message. It then shows
25Due to the random assignment, dropping one treatment group at an earlier date does not eect the
validity of the results. All specications include month xed eects. Robustness checks using six post-
treatment months, available upon request, show similar results.
26Results from a time-varying instrumental variables approach, aimed at calculating the corresponding
Treatment-on-the-Treated eect (available upon request), nd similar if slightly larger eects than the Intent-
to-Treat results reported in the paper. Robustness checks using four post-treatment months of the Intent-
to-Treat specication are similar, if somewhat less statistically signicant.
17that this increase in the perceived audit probability indeed has a smaller impact where the
VAT paper trail is present, even when looking at dierential eects within rms, holding all
rm characteristics constant.
Overall Eectiveness of Deterrence
Panel A in Figure 1 shows the impact of the deterrence letter on declared VAT of recipient
rms, compared to the control group, which received no letter. The x-axis indicates time,
with monthly observations. The vertical line represents the month when the letters were
mailed. The graph shows the percent dierence between medians of the treated and control
rms in each month. We see a marked jump in tax payments after receipt of the deterrence
letter. The median VAT income declared increases by about 12 percent and then slowly
decreases again to reach the same levels as the control group after about 18 months.27
This large response speaks to the credibility of the Chilean Tax Authority in shifting rms'
perceived monitoring risk and also indicates that rms do have scope to increase their tax
declarations in the face of heightened deterrence.
[Figure 1]
Table A1 in the Appendix conrms the dynamics of the eect of the deterrence letter in
regression form. The horizontal line marks the time of the mailing, with t1 indicating the
rst month aected by the letter, and the rows below showing monthly eects through one
year after mailing. Using the binary variables discussed above, it conrms the same pattern
shown for the median in the graphical results above: a marked increase immediately after
the mailing of the letter, and a steady decline thereafter.28 Given the large size of the treated
group, it is of course plausible that there were spillover eects on the control group. This
would bias the estimated eect of the treatment downwards since the spillover eects would
reduce evasion in the control group as well.
In order to establish whether it is really deterrence that drives the eect, I compare the
impact of the deterrence letter to that of the tax morale and placebo letters. Panels B and
C of Figure 1 show their impact. In contrast to the deterrence letter, no marked increase
is visible at the time of the mailing. The apparent rst increase in Panel B happens before
27Figure A6 shows a similar pattern for the second wave of mailing. It indicates that even ve months after
the rst wave, the deterrence message is perceived as credible. If anything, the treatment eect is stronger,
increasing the median by up to 18%. A possible reason is that tax evasion is suspected to have increased in
this period due to a downturn in the economy. All regression analysis include both waves of mailing.
28Since the rst four months have the strongest overall eect, all subsequent analysis for the Letter Message
Experiment is conducted using four post-treatment months. Robustness checks using six post-treatment
months, available upon request, show similar eects.
18mailing of the letter, and the second increase that occurs almost a year later is very unlikely
to be due to the morale letter. The variance is larger due to the smaller sample size. This
comparison shows that it is the content of the deterrence letter that drives the response, not
simply the fact of receiving mail from the tax authority.
Table 4 shows the same result in regressions for the mean and the four outcome variables
discussed above: median VAT, probability of declaring more than in the same month of
the previous year, probability of declaring more than predicted, and probability of declaring
any positive amount. All specications conrm a highly signicant impact of the deterrence
message, except for the regression using mean VAT, which as expected does not provide
statistically signicant results.29
[Table 4]
Interaction with the Paper Trail
It is important to remember that evaluating the direct impact of the letters messages is
not the focus of this paper. The goal is to use the randomly induced change in expected
audit risk to back out information about the eectiveness of the VAT paper trail. Having
established that the tax authority was able to credibly increase the expected audit proba-
bility, this section therefore turns to the analysis of the dierential impact for transactions
covered by the VAT paper trail. It rst compares dierent types of transactions overall and
then focuses on intra-rm analysis, in order to hold all rm-specic characteristics constant.
Table 5 displays the treatment eect of the deterrence message for the dierent types of
transactions. The rst two columns show the two components of the VAT: sales and input
costs. By denition, input costs are based on transactions between rms and are therefore
subject to a paper trail. If the paper trail has a preventive deterrence eect, one would
therefore expect less of a response to the additional deterrence message for input costs than
for sales. In line with the self-enforcement hypothesis, Columns (1) and (2) indeed show a
signicant response in sales, but not in input costs. The probability of increasing declared
sales compared to the previous year increases highly signicantly by 1.17%, while there is
an insignicant coecient of 0.16% for input costs.30
29The tax morale letter only has a signicant eect on the margin of declaring a positive amount. In line
with this, quantile results not shown here nd no signicant eects overall, except for an increase by those
with very low or negative declared VAT. For these rms, receiving a letter about high compliance by others
may have a deterrence eect, as it may raise speculation that the tax authority suspects them of evasion.
30This of course does not mean that only 1.13% of the rms responded to treatment, as rms may for many
other reasons be already above that threshold without the treatment, or far below it. The interpretation
of these coecients is the percent of rms that were pushed over the threshold of last year's payment due
to the increase from treatment. These coecients unfortunately do not have a very intuitive interpretation,
but they are well equipped to show relative responses between dierent types of rms or transactions.
19[Table 5]
The Chilean tax forms allow me to further disentangle the eect by distinguishing two
types of sales: intermediary sales to other rms and nal sales to consumers, where the
former are covered by the VAT paper trail and the latter are not. Columns (3) and (4) show
that the eect is again concentrated on the type of transaction not covered by the paper
trail, the sales to the nal consumer. The probability of increasing nal sales compared to
the previous year goes up by 1.33% and is highly signicant, while there is only a statistically
insignicant eect of 0.12% for intermediate sales.
The above analysis excludes retail rms that sell only to nal consumers, and upstream
rms that sell only to other rms. This limits the degree to which the dierential response
is driven by cross-rm variation. Since by denition pure retailers cannot respond on inter-
mediate sales or upstream rms on nal sales. When including the entire universe of rms
in the analysis (see Appendix Table A2), results are still consistent with the self-enforcing
hypothesis. We see a much stronger response on sales than on inputs, and on nal sales than
on intermediate sales. In this sample, there is some response on inter-rm sales. However,
this specication of course has to be interpreted with much caution, since many other char-
acteristics that can aect the response to a deterrence message, such as rm size, tax morale,
risk aversion, etc. could potentially be correlated with being a retailer or an upstream rm.
Even though Table 5 only compare transactions among rms that have both types of sales,
we can go one step further in ruling out spurious eects stemming from variation between
rms, by conrming these ndings in a within-rm estimation in Table 6. The regressions in
Table 6 follow the specication of Equation (3) in Section 3.4. This specication uses a data
set that contains an observation for each line item for each rm in a given month. Including
rm xed eects and rm xed eects times post-treatment period allows comparing the
response to the deterrence message between dierent line items within a rm. Any observable
or unobservable rm characteristics, both overall and for the treatment period, are thus held
constant.31 Column (1) compares the eect between sales and input costs, and conrms that
the response is clearly concentrated on sales, even when comparing transactions within the
rm. Column (2) compares the impact between nal and intermediary sales, and again nds
that the response is much stronger in nal than in intermediary sales.
[Table 6]
These results conrm that the nding of a lower response on transactions already covered
by a paper trail is not driven by heterogeneity between rms. As discussed in Section 2.2
31To address the large computational demands of two sets of high-dimensional xed eects, Stata routine
reg2hdfe was used (Guimaraes and Portugal, 2010). Including xed eects X post did not change the results.
20above, considering that at a given level of evasion, an audit can be expected to be more
eective where a paper trail is present, the fact that the response is lower on these trans-
actions suggests that the paper trail had a preventive deterrence eect, leading to ex ante
lower levels of evasion on transactions covered by the paper trail prior to the intervention.
Through the indirect experimental approach (Khwaja and Mian, 2011) of injecting deter-
rence into the system and observing the dierential response, we can back out an indication
of lower evasion on transactions covered by a VAT paper trail.
While we can hold constant any heterogeneity between rms, such as rm owners' risk
aversion and tax morale, rm size, industry, etc. the necessary assumption for this inference
is that the lower response to the deterrence message is not driven by a dierence within
rms between their nal sales and their other transactions. There are of course dierences
between nal and intermediate transactions within a rm, since it is not randomly assigned
whether the client is a consumer or another rm. We can also not test directly whether
rms interpret the letter to target nal sales in particular, though this did not seem to be
the case based on the qualitative interviews I conducted when pre-testing the letters. The
Spillover Experiment in Section 4.2 will therefore complement the ndings of the Letter
Message Experiment by showing the underlying mechanism in action.
Interaction with Firm Size
As discussed in Section 3.1, another dimension along which the information ows about tax
liabilities are thought to vary is rm size. Dierently to the VAT paper trail, where we can
analyze types of transactions within a given rm, the analysis by rm size necessarily implies
comparison across rms. Nevertheless, we can still see some interesting correlations. The
following section shows how the treatment eect varies with rm size, and how this relates
to the degree with which rms' sales are subject to the VAT paper trail.
Table 7 analyses how the treatment eect varies with both rm size and the share of sales
going to nal consumers. Column(1) shows that, consistent with the ndings in the previous
section, rms with a larger share of nal sales respond more strongly to the deterrence letter.
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 7 look at two dierent measures of rm size: the ocial two-
digit Chilean size classication, based on rms' revenues in the preceding year, and the log
of the number of employees in the pre-treatment year. For both measures, the treatment
eect decreases with size. Figure A7 in the appendix also displays the impact based on
three median regressions, one for each of the ocial Chilean size categories: micro, small
and medium. This is consistent with the idea of Kleven et al. (2009) that larger rms evade
fewer taxes since collusion is harder with a large number of employees. There may, of course,
21be many other reasons for this dierential response by size.32 With respect to the VAT, the
question arises whether the fact that small rms have a higher proportion of retail sales may
be driving the dierential response by rm size to some extent.
[Table 7]
Columns (4) and (5) include interactions of treatment with both the share of nal sales
and a size measure. As a result, the coecients on the size measures are reduced signicantly.
In Panel A, looking at the probability of declaring more than in the previous year, the size
coecients are reduced by about 40 percent, but stay signicant, while in Panel B, looking
at the probability of declaring more than predicted, they are reduced by about two thirds,
and are no longer statistically signicant. The coecient on the share of nal sales stays
highly signicant in all specications.
Since the specication in Panel B controls for dierential trends for these dierent groups
of rms over time, it provides the more reliable estimate. This would suggest that almost
two thirds of the larger response in smaller rms can be explained by the larger degree to
which their sales go to nal consumers, and are therefore not covered by the VAT paper trail.
However, this type of specic magnitude resulting from a horse-race regression between two
correlated variables of course needs to be interpreted with much caution.33 Nevertheless, the
results suggest that a signicant part of the higher evasion in smaller rms may be driven
by a weaker VAT paper trail.
4.2 Spillover Experiment
The Letter Message Experiment showed in the previous section that in Chile overall,
in general equilibrium across the whole country, an increase in deterrence generates less
of a response on transactions already covered by a VAT paper trail, suggesting that the
paper trail has a preventive deterrence eect. The Spillover Experiment compliments these
ndings and is designed to nd direct evidence for the underlying self-enforcing mechanism.
As discussed in Section 3.2 above, the experiment injects deterrence into the system in this
low compliance environment, to test for spillovers along the production chain. I measure
32Firms of dierent sizes may for example vary in their priors about the underlying audit probability, risk
aversion, use of other sources of paper trails such as electronic billing, etc. An additional reason for lower
evasion may be that in small rms, for example in a mom and pop store, the person making the evasion
decision (e.g. whether or not to give a receipt) is also the residual claimant of the tax money saved, while
in large rms, such as for example chain stores, this decision is usually made by an employee who does not
benet directly from evading the tax.
33If one of the variables is measured with more measurement error than the other, attenuation bias will
lead it to look relatively less important.
22such spillovers by comparing VAT declarations for trading partners of the treated rms to
trading partners of the control rms before and after the audit pre-announcement.
[Table 8]
Table 8 shows the impact of the audit pre-announcement on VAT payments of all trading
partners. There is a signicant increase in the declared VAT of related rms in the months
following the audit pre-announcements, showing that the pre-announcement had compliance
eects beyond the treated rm, promulgating through the network of their trading partners.
These results represent the rst documentation of tax enforcement on one rm generating
spillovers to other rms. Given these strong spillover eects, it might be in the interest of
tax authorities to take these indirect eects into account, when designing an audit strategy.
However, the overall spillover eects cannot by themselves establish that the channel is the
VAT chain. Such spillovers could also simply result from a perception of a general increase
in the audit risk by rms that are in communication with the treated rms.
Columns (3) and(4) of Table 8 therefore importantly test for the asymmetry in the
prediction of the VAT self-enforcement hypothesis as detailed in Section 2.2 and displayed
in Table 1. The spillover eects are shown separately for client and supplier rms.34 In
line with the predictions, there are strong increases in declared VAT for suppliers, and no
signicant eects for client rms. This establishes the directionality of the spillover eects
up the VAT chain. We can now rule out that the spillovers are simply the results of general
conversations about the audit pre-announcement with trading partners, leading to an overall
perception of increased audit risk in the area.
One remaining concern is that this dierential eect might be driven by the fact that
client and supplier rms are clearly dierent from each other. I therefore test for robustness
of this result by including a series of control variables and their interaction with treatment,
treatment period, etc. in Columns (5) and (6) of Table 8. The included control variables
are rm size, the sales' input ratio (a proxy that the Chilean Tax Authority uses to assess
suspicion of evasion), share of sales to the nal customers (a measure of the degree to which
the rm is an intermediate rm vs. a retailer), and nally a categorization of whether the
rm's industry is classied by the tax authority as \hard-to-monitor." The ndings remain
robust even after inclusion of the control variables, indicating that it is not the dierent
nature of supplier and client rms, but rather their position in the VAT chain that seems to
be driving the result.
34The very small number of trading partners that show up both as a client and as a supplier of some
of the audited rms are recorded both as a client and as a provider. All results are clustered at the level
of the audited rm. Any spillovers between the treatment and control group can be expected to lead to a
downward bias of the estimated spillover eects.
23The ndings of the Spillover Experiment provide several insights. First, as predicted by
the self-enforcement hypothesis, the built-in paper trail of the VAT leads to spillovers of
enforcement along the production chain. Monitoring a rm increases tax payments by its
upstream trading partners. Second, this indicates that when taking the whole network of
rms into account, the paper trail globally acts as a complement to the audit probability: it
augments the eectiveness of an increase in the audit probability for one rm, by increasing
VAT payments by other rms.
Third, the mere existence of information through the paper trail { not surprisingly { is
not in itself self-enforcing in an environment where the risk of cross-checks is low. Prior to the
audit announcement introduced through this study, self-enforcement was incomplete at best
among this sample of rms, even though a VAT system was in place. The small rms in this
sample, mostly located in remote areas, were probably correctly anticipating that the risk
of the tax authority double-checking their declarations was low. The additional deterrence
eect resulting from the pre-announced audits was necessary to trigger the eectiveness of
the VAT paper trail, indicating that it is only the interaction of information with deterrence
that leads to eective tax enforcement.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates the eectiveness of the Value Added Tax in facilitating tax en-
forcement and sheds light on the role of information and third-party paper trails for taxation.
It provides the rst micro-empirical evidence for the self-enforcing power of the paper trail
in the VAT and for spillovers in tax enforcement through rms' trading networks more gen-
erally, and shows that in line with a growing recent literature, information reporting plays a
crucial role for eective taxation.
Two randomized eld experiments shed light on the role of the paper trail in the VAT.
The Letter Message Experiment looks at the entire economy of Chile and investigates the
deterrence eect of the VAT paper trail in general equilibrium in a well-functioning VAT
system. It nds that holding rm characteristics constant, transactions that are already
subject to the VAT paper trail respond much less to an increase in the perceived audit
probability. Since for a given level of evasion, an audit can be expected to be more eective
where a paper trail is present, the fact that the response is lower suggests that the paper trail
had a preventive deterrence eect, leading to lower levels of evasion on transactions covered
by the paper trail. In line with predictions of Kleven et al. (2009), the Letter Message
Experiment also nds a stronger response for smaller rms. Controlling for the degree of
24retail sales reduces this dierential response considerably, suggesting that a signicant part
of the higher evasion among smaller rms may be driven by a weaker paper trail.
The Spillover Experiment looks at the underlying dynamic that creates the preventive
deterrence eect of the paper trail, and is designed to show the self-enforcing mechanism in
action. It nds that as predicted by the self-enforcement hypothesis, increasing the audit
probability of rms suspected of evasion generates spillovers up the VAT paper trail that
lead to an increase of their suppliers' tax payments. These multiplier eects indicate that
globally the VAT paper trail acts as a complement to the audit probability.
The combined ndings of both experiments also show that while in Chile overall, the
VAT paper trail seems to be highly eective, the mere existence of a VAT system, in the
absence of credible deterrence, does not lead to \self-enforcement" { as exemplied by the
low compliance among the sample of the Spillover Experiment prior to the intervention. It
is the interaction of information with deterrence that leads to eective tax enforcement.
These results have a number of implications for public nance in developing countries and
for tax policy in general. First, and most broadly, in line with ndings from the literature
on corruption and illegal capture of public funds, such as Reinikka and Svensson (2004), the
conclusions conrm that veriable paper trails on nancial ows can provide a powerful tool,
rendering misappropriation of funds more dicult.
Second, the results are informative for the choice of tax instruments. They suggest that
forms of taxation such as the VAT, which leave a stronger paper trail and thereby generate
more information for the tax authority, provide an advantage for tax collection over other
forms of taxation, such as a retail sales tax. Other mechanisms that provide information to
the government, such as online billing systems or electronic receipts, as recently introduced
by Brazil and Kenya, may have high returns. Further research is required to investigate
the eectiveness of such mechanisms, as well as the dimensions of generalizability of these
ndings. For example, the Chilean Tax Authority has a reputation of being highly eective
and having low levels of corruption. So the question arises how this may aect the results.
On one hand, the paper trail may be more important in high corruption environments, as it
reduces the discretion of tax ocials (e.g. Baurer, 2005). At the same time, the paper trail
may be less eective where enforcement can be circumvented by paying o the tax auditor.
Third, the spillover eects are relevant for the design of optimal audit strategies. When
choosing which rms to audit, a tax authority may not only want to consider the expected
impact on the audited rm, but also the multiplier eect through a rm's trading network.
In particular, the higher response in nal sales and spillovers along the supply chain suggest
that increasing the audit probability at the end of the production chain is benecial both
because it yields higher direct returns and because the spillovers will transmit the eect up
25the production chain. At the same time, enforcement at the nal sales stage is also more
costly, given the absence of a paper trail and the smaller average rm size. Further research
is required to analyze how to optimally allocate audit probabilities to dierent nodes in the
network.
Fourth, as Emran and Stiglitz (2005) point out, the VAT is only eective among rms in
the formal sector, and a heavy reliance on the VAT can therefore increase the inter-sectorial
distortions between formal and informal sectors. De Paula and Scheinkman (2010) nd that
where the VAT is present, formalized rms tend to trade with other formalized rms, since
these can provide them with receipts that allow them to deduct the input costs from VAT
payments, while informal rms tend to trade among themselves. Combined with the spillover
ndings, this suggests that enforcing formalization at the nal stage of production might
potentially contribute to formalizing entire production chains.
Fifth, the dierential enforcement through the paper trail at dierent production stages
leads to dierences in eective tax rates and potential distortions in the market. If the evasion
rate is higher for downstream rms, a at VAT rate will result in upstream rms paying a
higher eective tax rate. This dierence in the tax rate may lead to incentives for increased
vertical integration at the last production stage and can create distortions in production
between intermediary goods and nal goods. On the other hand, if small rms can evade
more, this may lead rms to stay ineciently small to reduce their eective tax burden.
Further research is required to investigate whether such distortions will be economically
signicant and warrant a revision of the frequently postulated recommendation that, putting
aside redistributive considerations, a at nominal VAT rate is optimal (e.g. Ebrill, 2001).
Finally, the results suggest a possible explanation for the dierences in tax evasion be-
tween developed and developing economies. In many developing countries, home production
plays an important role, gains from trade and division of labor are relatively small, and pro-
duction chains tend to be shorter. Moreover, if gains from trade are small, division of labor
may not only be low, but also more elastic with respect to taxation. If the division of labor
leads to transactions between agents, which { in contrast to home production { are traceable
by the tax authority, small taxes may be enough to discourage such divisions and thereby
erode the traceable tax base. All these factors may make it harder for developing countries to
develop an eective tax system, since they reduce the number of transactions that can lead
to veriable paper trails { through the VAT or through other forms of third-party reporting.
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Figure 1: Impact of the three types of letters
Notes: This gure plots the monthly percent dierence between the medians of the treatment and the control
group for each type of letter: (median VAT treatment group - median VAT control group) / (median VAT
control group), normalizing pre-treatment percent dierence to zero. The y-axis indicates time, with monthly
observations, and zero indicates the last month before the mailing of the letters. The vertical line marks
mailing of the letters. The gure shows the rst wave of mailing. For the second (much smaller) wave of
mailing, see Figure A6.
30Table 1: Two Forms of VAT Evasion on Inter-Firm Transactions
Position in supply chain Omission Discrepancies
Supplier Sales " VAT " Sales " VAT "
Treated rm
Inputs "
VAT (")
Inputs #
VAT "
Sales " Sales "
Client Inputs " VAT # Inputs # VAT "
Notes: \Omission" stands for the type of evasion where a transaction is omitted from the books of both
the seller and the buyer rm. \Discrepancies" stands for the type of evasion where the books of the
seller and the buyer reveal discrepancies. Buyers, for whom inputs represent a tax deduction, will tend
to overstate the value of the transaction, while sellers, for whom the transaction represents a tax liability,
will tend to understate its value. The arrows indicate the expected direction of change for the line item
in question resulting from an increased audit probability on the treated rm.
31Table 2: Letter Message Experiment: Baseline Summary Statistics and Balance of Ran-
domization
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Control Group Dierence Dierence Dierence
to Deterrence to Tax Morale to Placebo
Monthly VAT (mean) 264,029 3,105 305 -10,565
(1,871) (3,744) (7,869) (7,472)
Monthly VAT (median) 69,892 -779 -1,841 7
(458) (920) (1,959) (1,836)
Firm age in months 108 -0.32 -0.43 -0.60
(0.12) (0.25) (0.51) (0.51)
% Non-led declarations 4.3 -0.03 -0.07 -0.02
(0.02) (0.05) (0.10) (0.10)
% No sales year prior 1.5 -0.05 0.06 -0.01
(0.02) (0.04) (0.09) (0.09)
% Micro size 74.5 -0.04 -0.28 -0.6
(0.08) (0.16) (0.33) (0.33)
% Small size 18.2 0.028 0.102 -0.055
(0.07) (0.14) (0.29) (0.29)
% Medium size 2.8 0.01 0.02 0.07
(0.03) (0.06) (0.12) (0.13)
% Retail rms 28.7 -0.06 -0.28 -0.13
(0.08) (0.16) (0.34) (0.34)
% Intermediary rms 38.2 0.15 0.31 -0.08
(0.09) (0.18) (0.37) (0.37)
% Final sales 45.6 -0.10 -0.29 -0.07
(0.08) (0.17) (0.35) (0.35)
Number of rms 306,605 102,031 18,579 18,519
Notes: Each row shows a regression of the pre-treatment variable in question on treatment dummies and
a constant term. The constant term captures the value for the control group. Monthly VAT winzorized
at the top and bottom 0.1%. Columns (2)-(4) show the dierence of the treatment groups to the control
group. None of the dierences are statistically signicant at the 10%-level. Monetary amounts are in
Chilean pesos, with 500 pesos approximately equivalent to 1 USD. Robust standard errors in parentheses,
clustered at the rm level for all variables except for median tax paid, for which the table shows the
result of a median regression for October 2008, the month before the tax payment. All other observations
are monthly for ten months prior to treatment (from January 2008).
32Table 3: Spillover Experiment: Baseline Summary Statistics and Balance of Randomization
All Firms Audited Firms Trading Partners
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Control Group Dierence Control Group Dierence Trading Partners Dierence
of Control Group
Monthly VAT (mean) -18,452 -3,849 -8,024 -16,385 1,077,915 11,845
(11,370) (12,326) (6,271) (12,988) (81,348) (115,061)
Monthly VAT (median) 0 0 0 0 244,872 -11,454
(0) (0) (0) (0) (16,869) (23,470)
Firm age in months 130.93 -0.43 138.98 -3.33 126.46 1.5
(1.19) (1.69) (2.18) (3.13) (1.77) (2.52)
% Non-led declaration 1.09 0.1 0.40 -0.21 1.30 -0.42*
(0.13) (0.18) (0.11) (0.13) (0.19) (0.23)
Size category 2.28 -0.000047 2.34 0.02 5.90 0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.09)
% Retail rms 6.82 -0.54 7.27 -1.16 2.22 -0.56
(0.48) (0.66) (0.94) (1.28) (0.48) (0.60)
% Intermediary rms 66.32 -0.46 63.01 1.01 35.25 -1.53
(0.89) (1.27) (1.76) (2.46) (1.50) (2.14)
% Final sales 15.66 -0.35 19.37 -2.99 22.60 0.25
(0.65) (0.91) (1.35) (1.82) (1.08) (1.46)
Sales/input 0.68 -0.01 0.73 -0.03 1.64 -0.14
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.10) (0.11)
% Agriculture 54.00 0.71 45.31 5.34** 18.07 2.00
(0.94) (1.33) (1.81) (2.55) (1.29) (1.83)
% Audited 27.04 0.46 100 0
(0.84) (1.19) (.) (.)
% Suppliers 57.13 -1.32
(1.44) (2.10)
Number of rms 2,800 2,800 757 770 1,444 1385
Notes: This table shows summary statistics for the pre-treatment period and balance of randomization for three groups: the 5,600 rms in the
sample of the Spillover Experiment, the rms that were actually audited, and the trading partners of the audited rms. Each row shows three
regressions of the pre-treatment variable in question on a dummy indicating treatment assignment and a constant term: Columns (1) and (2) for
the rms in the full Spillover Experiment sample, Columns (3) and (4) for the audited rms, and Columns (5) and (6) for the trading partners.
Observations are monthly for ten months prior to treatment, starting in January 2008. The constant terms shown in Columns (1), (3) and (5)
capture the values for the control group. Columns (2), (4) and (6) show the dierence of the treatment group to the control group. Monetary
amounts are in Chilean pesos, with 500 Chilean pesos approximately equivalent to 1 USD. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at
the rm level for Columns (1) to (4) and at the audited rm's level for Columns (5) and (6). *** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, * = p<0.1
3
3Table 4: Letter Message Experiment: Intent-to-Treat Eects on VAT Payments by Type of Letter
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mean VAT Median
VAT
Percent VAT >
Previous Year
Percent VAT >
Predicted
Percent VAT
> Zero
Deterrence letter X post -1144 5,302*** 1.40*** 1.42*** 0.53***
(2804) (1,214) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09)
Tax morale letter X post -1840 1,419 0.40 0.30 0.44**
(6082) (2,552) (0.25) (0.22) (0.20)
Placebo letter X post 835 1,430 -0.11 -0.19 -0.14
(6243) (2,598) (0.26) (0.23) (0.20)
Constant 268810*** 69,459*** 47.50*** 48.27*** 67.30***
(1799) (432) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
Month xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm xed eects Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Treatment Assignment No Yes No No No
Number of observations 7,892,076 445,734 7,892,076 7,892,076 7,892,076
Number of rms 445,734 445,734 445,734 445,734 445,734
Adjusted R2 0.40 0.14 0.28 0.47
Notes: Column (1) shows a regression of the mean declared VAT on treatment dummies, winzorized at the top and bottom 0.1%. Column (2)
shows a median regression of the mean post-treatment VAT, and Columns (3)-(5) show linear probability regressions of the probability of an increase
in declared VAT since the previous year, the probability of declaring more than predicted and the probability of declaring any positive amount.
Coecients and standard errors of the linear probability regressions are multiplied by 100 to express eects in percent. Monetary amounts are in
Chilean pesos, with 500 Chilean pesos approximately equivalent to 1 USD. Standard errors in parentheses, robust and clustered at the rm level for
Columns (1) and (3)-(5). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
3
4Table 5: Impact of Deterrence Letter on Dierent Types of Transactions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Percent Sales Percent Input Costs Percent Intermediary Percent Final Sales
> > Sales > >
Previous Year Previous Year Previous Year Previous Year
Deterrence letter X post 1.17*** 0.16 0.12 1.33***
(0.22) (0.21) (0.19) (0.21)
Constant 55.39*** 53.25*** 38.37*** 45.04***
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12)
Month xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 2,392,529 2,392,529 2,392,529 2,392,529
Number of rms 133,156 133,156 133,156 133,156
Adjusted R2 0.25 0.22 0.30 0.32
Notes: Regressions of the probability of the line item (total sales, total input costs, intermediary sales, and nal sales) being higher than in the
same month the previous year. Sample of rms that have both nal and intermediary sales in the year prior to treatment. Coecients and
standard errors are multiplied by 100 to express eects in percent. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the rm level. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
3
5Table 6: Within-Firm Estimator of Dierential Response by Type of Transaction
Percent Line-Item > Percent Line-Item >
Previous Year Previous Year
Deterrence letter X sales X post 1.26***
(0.17)
Deterrence letter X nal sales X post 1.23***
(0.23)
Sales 1.98***
(0.51)
Final sales 5.64***
(0.12)
Sales X post Yes
Final Sales X post Yes
Firm xed eects X post Yes Yes
Month xed eects Yes Yes
Firm xed eects Yes Yes
Number of observations 4,785,058 4,785,058
Number of rms 133,156 133,156
R2 0.32 0.24
Notes: Regression of the probability of the line item being higher than in the same month the previous year
in a data set that contains multiple line items per rm and month. Column (1) compares increases in sales to
increases in input costs within a given rm, Column (2) compares nal sales to intermediate sales. The reg2hdfe
routine (Guimaraes and Portugal, 2010), used to produce the large number two-level xed eects (rm xed
eects and rm xed eect X post), does not produce a constant term. Sample of rms that have both nal
and intermediary sales in the period prior to treatment. Coecients and standard errors are multiplied by 100
to express eects in percent. Sample contains all rms that have both nal and intermediary sales in the period
prior to treatment. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the rm level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
36Table 7: Interaction of Firm Size and Share of Sales to Final Consumers
Panel A: Percent VAT > Previous Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Deterrence letter X nal sales share 1.61*** 1.48*** 1.43***
(0.26) (0.27) (0.26)
Deterrence letter X size category -0.17*** -0.10***
(0.04) (0.04)
Deterrence letter X log employees -0.45*** -0.29**
(0.11) (0.12)
Deterrence letter 0.68*** 2.63*** 1.66*** 1.49*** 0.92***
(0.16) (0.29) (0.13) (0.35) (0.19)
Constant 47.53*** 48.87*** 47.50*** 48.89*** 47.53***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Final sales share X post Yes No No Yes Yes
Size measure X post No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,308,631 7,116,590 7,340,994 7,084,823 7,308,631
Number of Firms 406,834 396,135 408,636 394,367 406,834
Adjusted R2 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
Panel B: Percent VAT > Predicted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Deterrence Letter X nal sales share 1.51*** 1.51*** 1.44***
(0.23) (0.25) (0.24)
Deterrence Letter X size category -0.10*** -0.03
(0.03) (0.04)
Deterrence Letter X log employees -0.28*** -0.11
(0.10) (0.11)
Deterrence Letter 0.74*** 2.15*** 1.57*** 1.00*** 0.83***
(0.14) (0.26) (0.12) (0.32) (0.16)
Constant 48.48*** 49.79*** 48.26*** 50.01*** 48.48***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Final sales share X post Yes No No Yes Yes
Size measure X post No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,308,631 7,116,590 7,340,994 7,084,823 7,308,631
Number of Firms 406,834 396,135 408,636 394,367 406,834
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.26 0.29 0.26 0.28
Notes: Regression of the probability of monthly VAT declared being higher than in the same month the previous
year (Panel A) and on being higher than predicted (Panel B). Coecients and standard errors are multiplied by
100 to express eects in percent. Sample includes all rms in the deterrence treatment and in the control group.
Number of observations vary due to missing observations for some variables. Final sales share is not dened for
rms with zero sales in preceding year, size category is not available for new rms. Robust standard errors in
parentheses, clustered at the rm level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
37Table 8: Spillover Eects on Trading Partners' VAT Payments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Percent VAT
> Previous
Year
Percent
VAT >
Predicted
Percent VAT
> Previous
Year
Percent
VAT >
Predicted
Percent VAT
> Previous
Year
Percent
VAT >
Predicted
Audit announcement X 2.50** 2.08*
post (1.15) (1.12)
Audit announcement X 4.57*** 4.06*** 4.43*** 3.96***
supplier X post (1.56) (1.51) (1.53) (1.53)
Audit announcement X -0.26 -0.26 -0.13 -0.25
client X post (1.66) (1.52) (1.69) (1.56)
Supplier X post -0.71 0.34 -1.19 0.61
(1.62) (1.58) (1.66) (1.64)
Constant 52.07*** 49.06*** 52.07*** 49.06*** 52.75*** 50.11***
(0.95) (0.94) (0.95) (0.94) (0.96) (0.96)
Controls X post No No No No Yes Yes
Controls X
audit announcement X post No No No No Yes Yes
Month xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 45,264 45,264 45,264 45,264 44,288 44,288
Number of rms 2,829 2,829 2,829 2,829 2,768 2,768
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.10
Notes: Regressions for trading partners of audited rms. Column (1), (3) and (5) shows the probability of an increase in declared VAT since the
previous year, Column (2), (4) and (6) shows the probability of declaring more than predicted. The controls in Columns (4) and (6) are rm
sales, sales/input-ratio, share of sales going to nal consumers, and industry categorized as \hard-to-monitor." Time period includes six months
after mailing of the audit announcements. Coecients and standard errors are multiplied by 100 to express eects in percent. Robust standard
errors in parentheses, clustered at the level of the audited rm. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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8APPENDIX FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION
A Letter Templates (Translated from Spanish)
Santiago, November 19th 2008.
Mr(s). Abc 
Business XYZ 
210 Example Street
Concepción
Ref: SII informs about analysis of your company
Mr. (s) Taxpayer: 
This is an informational letter and, therefore, does not require that you take any action vis-à-
vis the SII.
We would like to inform you that in a process of random selection process among the micro, 
small and medium size enterprises (MSMEs), YOUR FIRM HAS BEEN SELECTED FOR 
ANALYSIS. In the event that any irregularities are detected, you could be summond for an 
audit.
Our intention is to inform you of the usual actions that the SII carries out, and at the same time 
to remind you to always declare all purchases, sales and services, and deduct only the credits 
to which you are entitled.
We emphasize that this letter DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY PROCEEDINGS with the SII, and 
therefore YOU DO NOT NEED TO VISIT our offices.
On the SII Web site www.sii.cl, you may select the option "Contact Us" to ask questions or 
make suggestions, or you may call our Help Desk, telephone numbers 2-395 11 15, for 
clarification regarding the use of electronic tax services.
 
Yours sincerely,
Internal Revenue Service
Figure A1: Deterrence Letter
39Santiago, November 19
th 2008
Mr. (s) 
Business XYZ 
210 Example Street
Concepción
Did you know that Chile has one of the highest levels of tax 
compliance in the world?
Dear Taxpayer: 
We wish to inform you that 98.3% of the taxes in our country are paid on a voluntary basis. 
This has allowed Chile to have one of the highest levels of tax compliance worldwide, 
according to information from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD).
This success is a result of the fact that the majority of Chileans declare and pay taxes in 
accordance with the provisions of the law.
 
We invite you to continue on this path and together achieve the country we all want, a Chile 
with more and more integrity, solidarity and development.  
Yours sincerely, 
Internal Revenue Service
Figure A2: Tax Morale Letter
40Santiago, November 19
th 2008.
Mr(s) Abc
Business XYZ
210 Example Street
Concepción
Ref: Visit the Web site of the Internal Revenue Service (www.sii.cl) 
        
Dear Taxpayer: 
We want to tell you that the SII Virtual Office now has an option called "Electronic Tax 
Folder", a tool that allows taxpayers to bring together in a single electronic document, 
statements and tax information that they are required to submit to banks or other institutions.
For more information, you can visit the SII Virtual Office website (www.sii.cl), menu “Tax 
Status”, option “Electronic Tax Folder”.
In our Virtual Office you will also find online deals, news, economic indicators, tax 
information, FAQs and guidelines for most of your dealings with the SII, such as tax returns, 
changes in information and payment of contributions.
Take advantage of the internet: visit www.sii.cl.
  
Yours sincerely,
Internal Revenue Service
Figure A3: Placebo Letter
41Santiago, November 19th 2008.
Mr. (s) 
Business XYZ 
210 Example Street
Concepción
Ref: Information about the SII future audit process. 
Dear Taxpayer: 
This is an informational letter and, therefore, does not require that you take any action vis-à-
vis the SII.
We wish to inform you that according to control policies carried out by our institution, and 
under Law 18,320, YOU WILL RECEIVE A NOTIFICATION THAT YOU WILL BE 
AUDITED AT SOME POINT BETWEEN JUNE AND AUGUST 2009.
The purpose of this letter is to give you time to prepare your records for future audit. Later, 
you can expect a FORMAL NOTIFICATION LETTER, which will inform you which SII 
office you need to attend, what documents you need to bring and the date of the audit. 
As such, YOU SHOULD NOT APPROACH THE SII OFFICES before receiving the formal 
notification letter.
Also, remember that you can declare, correct or amend your earlier statements in the SII 
Virtual Office on the internet (www.sii.cl).
Yours sincerely,
Internal Revenue Service
Figure A4: Pre-Announcement Letter
42B Additional Figures
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Figure 1: Distribution of monthly taxes paid 
 excluding the top and bottom 5% 
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Figure A5: Distribution of monthly declared VAT excluding the top and bottom 5%
432nd Wave -505101520Percent Difference in Median VAT -24-18-12-60612 Month
2nd Wave: Deterrence vs. Control (Median)
Figure A6: Impact of Deterrence Letter: Second Wave of Mailing
Notes: This gure plots the monthly percent dierence between the medians of the treatment and the
control group of the deterrence letter for the second wave of mailing: (median VAT treatment group - median
VAT control group) / (median VAT control group), normalizing pre-treatment percent dierence to zero.
The y-axis indicates time, with monthly observations, and zero indicates the last month before the mailing
of the letters. The vertical line marks mailing of the letters. Since the second wave of mailing is much
smaller than the rst, the gure shows a more noisy pattern than the rst wave displayed in Figure 1, Panel A.
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Figure A7: Impact by Firm Size (Median Regression)
Notes: Each bar represents a separate median regression for each size category. The numbers on top of the
bars indicate the coecient on being in the deterrence letter treatment group of a median regression of mean
monthly VAT payments in the four months following treatment. The height of the bar indicates the eect
in percent relative to the mean in the control group in that size category. *** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, * =
p<0.1
45C Additional Tables
Dynamics over Time
Table A1: Deterrence Letter Experiment: Monthly Eects on VAT Payments
(1) (2) (3)
Percent VAT > Previous Year Percent VAT > Predicted Percent VAT > Zero
Deterrence X t-5 -0.02 -0.12 -0.07
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
Deterrence X t-4 0.26 0.03 0.02
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
Deterrence X t-3 0.10 -0.29* -0.03
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
Deterrence X t-2 0.05 -0.30* -0.14
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
Deterrence X t-1 0.19 -0.07 -0.09
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
Deterrence X t1 1.07*** 1.17*** 0.48***
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
Deterrence X t2 1.76*** 1.73*** 0.56***
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
Deterrence X t3 1.46*** 1.30*** 0.48***
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
Deterrence X t4 1.64*** 1.21*** 0.46***
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
Deterrence X t5 0.99*** 0.83*** -0.15
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
Deterrence X t6 0.94*** 0.72*** 0.12
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
Deterrence X t7 0.88*** 0.59*** 0.04
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
Deterrence X t8 0.92*** 0.63*** 0.17
(0.19) (0.20) (0.20)
Deterrence X t9 0.85*** 0.75*** 0.31
(0.19) (0.20) (0.20)
Deterrence X t10 0.87*** 0.68*** 0.10
(0.19) (0.20) (0.20)
Deterrence X t11 0.73*** 0.82*** 0.16
(0.19) (0.20) (0.20)
Deterrence X t12 0.77*** 0.51*** 0.12
(0.19) (0.20) (0.20)
Constant 47.00*** 48.26*** 65.31***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Month xed eects Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs. 6,859,747 6,859,747 6,859,747
Number of rms 408,636 408,636 408,636
R2 0.004 0.000 0.005
Notes: Each column shows a linear probability regression on interaction terms of being assigned to
receive a deterrence letter with month dummies. Coecients and standard errors are multiplied by 100
to express eects in percent. Sample includes all rms in the deterrence treatment and the control group.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the rm level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
46Alternate Sample for Table 5
Table A2: Impact of Deterrence Letter on Dierent Types of Transaction
Sample Including Pure Retailers and Intermediary Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Percent Sales > Percent Input Costs > Percent Intermediary Percent Final Sales >
Previous Year Previous Year Sales > Previous Year Previous Year
Deterrence 1.01*** -0.02 0.22** 0.90***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10)
Constant 50.07*** 48.94*** 29.40*** 29.03***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Month xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 7,340,994 7,340,994 7,340,994 7,340,994
Number of rms 408,636 408,636 408,636 408,636
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.25 0.38 0.47
Notes: Regressions of the probability of the line item (total sales, total input costs, intermediary sales, and nal sales) being higher than in
the same month the previous year, among the full sample including pure retailers and intermediary rms. Coecients and standard errors are
multiplied by 100 to express eects in percent. Sample includes all rms in the deterrence treatment and the control group. Robust standard
errors in parentheses, clustered at the rm level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure A8
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